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The March 24, 1894 edition of the Boston Evening Transcript contained a letter to the
editor titled “The Medical Registration Act.” 1 The author began: “I have just signed a petition
. . . begging our legislature not to pass a bill now pending, of which the purpose is to ‘regulate’
the practice of medicine and surgery.”
The writer of this letter—William James, M.D., of Cambridge—is remembered today as
the father of American academic psychology and as a co-founder of the American philosophical
school known as “pragmatism.” 2 Although he had produced only a small portion of his
influential body of work by 1894, he was already a familiar figure to much of the Transcript’s
Brahmin readership. The 52-year-old Harvard professor’s orations on a variety of topics attracted
large and enthusiastic audiences. Though increasingly identified as a philosopher, James’s
scientific credentials were also impressive. He had earned a medical degree from Harvard, had
started his academic career teaching anatomy and physiology, and had established the country’s
first experimental psychology laboratory. James was thus a persuasive commentator on matters
of medical policy. 3
The measure that James attacked would have prohibited any person from practicing
medicine in Massachusetts unless he either possessed a degree from a “reputable” medical
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school or passed an examination administered by a state board of examiners. In his letter, James
offered various objections to the creation of such a medical licensing regime. First of all, he
explained, the bill “is too grandmotherly, and goes against the best political habits and traditions
of our state.” It would be a “grotesque and puerile anomaly,” he declared, for the commonwealth
to stand between a citizen and the therapeutic advisor of his choice. “If the word ‘sacred’ can be
applied to any personal right, surely the right to treat one’s own body as one chooses may claim
the title.”
Second, James maintained that the proposed scheme offered little actual protection to
citizens, for the “serious therapeutic inadequacy which the population of Massachusetts . . . is
exposed to is the inadequacy of the regular educated profession.” He observed that despite
undoubted advances in anatomy and diagnosis, treatment remained a matter of guesswork for
doctors—a task “still beyond their powers.” James remarked, “There is no more epigramatic
[sic] instance of that combined greatness and littleness of man’s mind . . . than this capacity to
give interminable clinical lectures over patients to whom we are radically unable to afford real
help.” Although he did not directly claim that drugless approaches, such as Mind Cure and
Christian Science, produced results superior to those of Regular medicine, he came close. The
truth of the alternative practitioners’ theories might be uncertain, James remarked, but “their
facts are patent and startling.”
Finally, James reached perhaps his most important point: “The suppression of certain
practitioners will hinder the progress of therapeutic knowledge as a whole.” The drugless
healers’ “brilliant” results demonstrated that “the agency of the patient’s mind” was a critical
aspect of the treatment of disease. If the proposed Medical Registration Act suppressed these
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practitioners’ treatments, scientists would lose the opportunity to observe and study them, and a
“public calamity” would result.
James and his allies ultimately prevailed. Although the legislature passed a revised
version of the bill, the enacted statute expressly exempted “clairvoyants [and] persons practising
[sic] hypnotism, magnetic healing, mind cure, massage methods, christian [sic] science,
cosmopathic, or any other method of healing.” 4
These developments in Massachusetts were typical of the American experience generally
following the Civil War. Although almost every state embraced medical licensing during the
Gilded Age, the legislation was written and implemented in ways that largely preserved citizens’
ability to choose their preferred therapeutic approach. And the struggle to shape this second
wave of medical licensing laws generated is own rich body of medical liberty literature.

Medical Practice in the Gilded Age
Gilded Age arguments about the regulation of medical practice were not merely a reprise
of the antebellum debates. The scientific and professional contexts had changed in ways that
significantly shaped the dispute.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, Regular physicians increasingly questioned the
efficacy of the depleting therapies—the profuse bleeding and liberal administration of
purgatives, emetics, and blistering agents—that characterized early American “heroic” medicine.
Even before the Civil War, doctors in the United States—under the influence of the “Paris
clinical school”—began embracing a more empirical, scientific approach that led them to doubt
the usefulness of such treatments. 5 After the war, some elite physicians developed an extreme
therapeutic skepticism and advocated reliance primarily on nature’s healing power.
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In practice, even the skeptics never rejected conventional therapeutics to the extent their
rhetoric suggests. Nonetheless, the Regular profession as a whole undeniably embraced a more
humble and flexible attitude as the century progressed. Doctors virtually abandoned bloodletting,
administered depleting drugs less frequently and in smaller doses, and added stimulating
therapies to their armamentarium. On the one hand, these changes made it increasingly difficult
for the Regulars’ rivals to paint them as doctrinaire bleeders and poisoners. On the other hand,
they also complicated orthodox physicians’ efforts to portray themselves as indispensable
healers, uniquely qualified to conquer disease. 6
During the Gilded Age, even those Regulars most skeptical of orthodox therapeutics had
reason to hope for scientific breakthroughs. As American doctors were aware, European
laboratory researchers had been making significant discoveries since mid-century. The most
important of these was the development, proof, and elaboration of the germ theory of disease by
Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch. Although American physicians were slower than their European
counterparts to accept the germ theory, many did by the 1890s. 7 By the end of the century,
research science was arguably the most important source of Regular medicine’s professional
authority. 8
But clinical research was a relatively weak foundation for authority so long as scientific
discoveries did not lead to actual therapeutic advances. Unfortunately, few important therapeutic
breakthroughs occurred during this period—most notably, antiseptic surgery, aspirin, and
diphtheria antitoxin. According to one modern commentator, only about six “reliable and
effective pharmaceutical preparations” existed at the start of the twentieth century. 9 This dearth
of effective orthodox remedies proved to be an important rhetorical weapon for alternative sects
in the Gilded Age medical licensing wars.
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Meanwhile, alternative practice itself changed in ways that made it harder for mainstream
physicians convincingly to cast all unorthodox practitioners as uneducated quacks. The dominant
irregular sects after the Civil War were the Homeopaths and Eclectics. 10 In stark contrast to the
antebellum Thomsonians, these movements embraced the need for medical education and
rigorous training, evinced a growing willingness to borrow remedies from other schools, and—
particularly in the case of the Homeopaths—attracted many well-off followers. 11
Homeopathic medicine, the brainchild of German practitioner Samuel Hahnemann, was
based on two main principles: (1) the “law of similia,” which stated that diseases could be cured
by drugs that produced symptoms in healthy individuals resembling those appearing in people
suffering from the disease in question, and (2) the “law of infinitesimals,” according to which a
drug’s efficacy rose as the dose was reduced through extreme dilution to the point where the
active ingredient was undetectable. After reaching America’s shores in the 1820s, Homeopathy
grew steadily more popular, and by the time of the Civil War, it was orthodox medicine’s largest
rival. Homeopaths viewed themselves as professional and scientific, and they established
numerous schools, associations, and journals. Eventually, the movement fragmented between
Hahnemannian purists, on the one hand, and “eclectic” Homeopaths who abandoned the law of
infinitesimals and used some non-homeopathic remedies, on the other. The latter dominated the
field by the 1880s. 12
The other leading sect, Eclectic medicine, focused on botanical cures. Eclectic medicine
derived from a botanical healing movement founded in the 1820s by Wooster Beach, a New
York doctor, as well as from Alva Curtis’s Independent Thomsonianism. As its name indicates,
it was generally nondogmatic and willing to borrow therapies from other schools. Like the
Homeopaths, the Eclectics embraced professionalization and founded numerous medical
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colleges. Although never as popular as Homeopathy—or as respectable among elites—Eclectic
medicine also had many followers during the Gilded Age. 13
In short, after the Civil War, the Regulars, Homeopaths, and Eclectics became
increasingly similar with respect to their practices, professional ethos, and institutional
structures. More and more, they borrowed approaches from and referred patients to each other. 14
And they mutually disdained the growing popularity of drugless healing approaches such as
magnetic healing, Mind Cure, and Christian Science.
The founders of these drugless sects shared an interest in the theories and practices of
Franz Anton Mesmer, a German physician who effected cures by supposedly transferring a
universal spiritual force to his patients—an invisible “fluid” he dubbed “animal magnetism.”
Whereas Mesmer sought to provoke violent convulsions in his patients, his followers refined his
technique to induce a peaceful, trance-like state. This “hypnotic” form of mesmerism, commonly
known as magnetic healing, became extremely widespread in the United States by the 1840s and
remained on the scene until the early twentieth century.
In the Gilded Age, the combination of mesmerism with mystically-infused belief systems
such as Swedenborgianism, Transcendentalism, and Spiritualism spawned a variety of additional
healing schools emphasizing immaterial, and sometimes divine, forces. 15 Many of these drugless
healers, under the influence of American mesmerist Phineas Parkhurst Quimby, began to
emphasize the mind’s power over the body and the importance of healthy mindedness and “right
belief.” 16 In the late nineteenth century, two of Quimby’s followers launched important Bostoncentered mental healing movements. In 1879, Mary Baker Eddy founded the Church of Christ
(Scientist), whose practitioners rejected the use of drugs and surgery and purported to cure
disease by persuading their patients of God’s goodness and the unreality of sin, sickness, and
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death. 17 Around the same time, Quimby disciple Warren Felt Evans helped forge a spiritual
(though less explicitly scriptural) school of thought known as the Mind Cure or New Thought
movement, which stressed the healing power of positive thinking. 18
Like the Homeopaths, many followers of Christian Science and Mind Cure were highly
educated, urbane, and economically privileged, and thus difficult for the Regulars to dismiss as
gullible rubes. In 1898, one sympathetic observer remarked that “no theory of cure in the history
of the healing art has grown in favor so rapidly among intelligent people as mental
therapeutics.” 19 Another remarked, “[T]he mental scientists and the healers are among the most
reputable people in [Massachusetts].” 20
As the late-nineteenth-century battle over licensing raged, American medicine was thus
divided into three main clusters of practitioners: (1) the Regulars, (2) the Homeopaths and
Eclectics, and (3) practitioners of various types of mental, spiritual, and religious healing
approaches. The Regulars were the driving force behind the return of medical licensing. The
latter two camps and their followers fought, with great success, to ensure that the new licensing
regimes would not discriminate against them.

The Resurgence of Medical Licensing
As we saw in the previous chapter, by 1861 most states had revoked their medical
practice laws, and the few remaining statutes were dead letters. The nationwide re-embrace of
medical licensing after the Civil War thus represents a remarkable U-turn. States first began
enacting new medical licensing schemes in the late 1860s. About seventeen states had such laws
on the books by 1880 and about forty did by 1890. By 1901, every single state and the District of
Columbia had a medical licensing regime of some sort in effect. 21
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The Gilded Age saw not only the proliferation of medical licensing systems, but also
their inexorable strengthening. The only prerequisite for obtaining a license under the earliest
postbellum laws was a diploma from a medical school—any medical school, including one of the
inferior or wholly fraudulent institutions that arose to exploit this lack of standards. In the early
1880s, states began to require that the diploma be from a “reputable” institution, as determined
by a state board of examiners. Many states also permitted candidates without a medical school
diploma to earn a license by passing a uniform examination administered by the board. During
the final decades of the century, all but a few states began to mandate that every aspiring
physician pass such an examination, regardless of his education. Consequently, by 1900, the
majority of states required both a diploma from a reputable medical school and passage of an
examination. 22
A variety of explanations have been advanced for the wide adoption of medical licensing
during this period. Some medical freedom activists of the time ascribed the trend to the evil
designs of the American Medical Association, the national organization for Regular physicians
founded in 1847. 23 Although the AMA certainly encouraged the surge in licensing, it was, at the
time, neither large nor powerful enough to play a significant direct role in the state legislative
arena. 24 Some modern scholars have attributed this second wave of licensing to revolutionary
developments in medical science—particularly the rise of the germ theory—and the
accompanying recognition that physicians must be well-educated. 25 As others have pointed out,
however, the germ theory did not achieve widespread acceptance among American doctors until
most states had already adopted licensure. 26
A combination of other factors probably impelled the proliferation and strengthening of
licensing laws during the Gilded Age. One was the growing political influence of state medical
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societies dominated by orthodox physicians. These organizations supported licensing as a means
of limiting competition in the medical marketplace and boosting the Regulars’ self-identification
as an exclusive and learned profession. 27 The return of medical licensing during this time was
also a manifestation of an increasing fondness among the country’s professional and business
classes for specialized expertise, in particular for appointed boards of scientific experts. 28
Regardless of its cause, the postbellum resurgence of medical licensing might lead one to
conclude that the American ethos in favor of freedom of therapeutic choice, so evident before the
Civil War, faded away afterward. But in fact, late-nineteenth-century Americans still broadly
favored allowing patients free choice among practitioners of different schools. Legislation
creating or strengthening licensing schemes regularly elicited fierce protests by common citizens,
particularly when these schemes appeared to favor orthodox medicine. The public preference for
nondiscrimination among different theories of medicine—often voiced through direct, streetlevel activism—was reflected both in the content of the licensing statutes themselves and in the
conduct of juries applying these statutes.

The Legal Impact of Popular Opposition
Legislation
Late-nineteenth-century medical practice laws were overwhelmingly drafted in ways that
protected the interests of alternative practitioners and their patients. This preservation of freedom
of therapeutic choice reflected the views of the citizenry as voiced in petition campaigns,
mobbed legislative hearings, and medical liberty literature. The participants in this genuine social
movement represented a broad swath of Americans. Reginald Fitz, a supporter of strong medical
licensing regimes, complained: “[The] opposition is diverse . . . . On the one hand is to be found
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the entire class of those likely to be shown to be ignorant, unskillful, dishonest, or corrupt. . . .
On the other hand we see intelligent theorists and educators, at time leaders in thought and
morals, who object to the infringement of personal rights. . . . 29
In some states, the widespread commitment to medical freedom successfully thwarted the
passage of licensing legislation of any type—at least for a while. For example, mass opposition
defeated an 1880 medical licensing bill in Massachusetts, even though the measure
accommodated the interests of Homeopaths and Eclectics. 30 A proponent of the law snidely
described its adversaries as “deceitful clairvoyants, long-haired spiritualists, necromancers,
wizards, witches, seers, magnetic healers, [and] pain charmers.” 31 But a modern scholar’s
research demonstrates that the petitions against the bill were signed by a wide variety of people,
ranging from laborers to professionals and businessmen. 32
Under pressure from medical freedom forces, some legislatures included explicit
nondiscrimination clauses in the licensing bills they enacted. For example, Virginia’s 1884 law
instructed that no applicant for a medical license be rejected for his “adherence to any particular
school of medicine or system of practice, nor on account of his views as to the method of
treatment and cure of diseases.” 33 Rhode Island’s 1895 measure stated, “Nothing in this chapter
shall be so construed as to discriminate against any particular school or system of medicine.” 34
Texas elevated medical nondiscrimination to a constitutional principle: its 1876 state constitution
provided, “The Legislature may pass laws prescribing the qualifications of practitioners of
medicine in this State, and to punish persons for malpractice, but no preference shall ever be
given by law to any schools of medicine.” 35
Legislatures that did not enact broad nondiscrimination clauses protected the rights of
alternative practitioners and their patients in other ways. For example, almost all late-nineteenth10

century medical practice acts gave Homeopaths a role in administering medical examinations
and issuing licenses, and most gave Eclectics a place at the table as well. Indeed, these sects
often had their own tables; almost a quarter of states created either two boards (Regular and
Homeopathic) or three (Regular, Homeopathic, and Eclectic). 36And more than two-thirds of
states with a single board guaranteed sectarian representation on that body. 37
These developments did not arise primarily from any newfound tolerance among Regular
physicians, although an authentic decline of dogmatism may have facilitated cooperation. 38 A
more important factor was probably the orthodox medical establishment’s recognition that in
light of the Homeopaths’ and Eclectics’ popular appeal, any viable medical licensing regime had
to include them. 39 Regulars also had a monetary motivation for entering this alliance; they
increasingly received referrals from doctors in the other sects. 40 Whereas the impulse to preserve
orthodox purity was once so strong that the original AMA Code of Ethics, written in 1847,
effectively banned consultation with irregular doctors, the authors of the 1903 amended Code
omitted this provision because they deemed it to be unreasonable, anachronistic, and
impractical. 41
Some states also accommodated nonorthodox practitioners by omitting topics of
fundamental controversy between the different schools from licensing examinations. The most
commonly excluded subjects were therapeutics and materia medica (therapeutic substances). In
most other states, applicants from the alternative sects were examined on these subjects, or on all
subjects, by representatives of their own school. The authors of a 1907 AMA survey of state
licensing laws noted a widespread conviction “that an examination for a license should be purely
a test of technical knowledge and of facts which are established beyond dispute . . . and that,
having demonstrated a sufficient knowledge of the composition and functions of the human

11

body, the applicant should be allowed perfect freedom in the choice of remedial agents or choice
of treatment.” 42
Developments in New York State illustrate the dynamics of legislative battles over
medical licensing in the Gilded Age. The state legislature, which revoked medical licensing in
1844 in an episode recounted in Chapter One, revived it in 1874. The new statute was
nondiscriminatory; it mandated that applicants have either a diploma from any chartered medical
school or a certification of qualification from any of the state’s “several medical societies”
(including the Homeopathic and Eclectic societies). 43
In 1885, the Regular-dominated Medical Society of the State of New York began
pressuring the legislature to create an Examining and Licensing Board that would administer a
single general examination to all candidates. 44 The New York Times, while praising this proposal
as a “discreet and well-considered attempt” to suppress quackery, expressed concern that it
would founder because of quarreling between the “zealots” of different schools. The bill indeed
failed, apparently because the Regulars insisted that their society have the power to appoint six
of the board’s nine members and that the mandatory examination cover therapeutics. 45
According to one observer, “[E]very attempt to secure legislation made by regular practitioners
[was] strenuously opposed by homeopaths and eclectics, as well as by an army of Christian
scientists, clairvoyants, magnetists, mind curers, faith curers, truss-makers, and all those wishing
to engage in the business of healing the sick without training or study.” 46
The Regulars renewed their efforts in 1889, promoting a bill that would have established
a board composed of five members nominated by their society, three nominated by the
Homeopathic Society, and one nominated by the Eclectic Society. The bill further provided that
a graduate of a Homeopathic or Eclectic college could choose which board member would
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examine him on certain topics. 47 The alternative sects were still not satisfied; they did not trust
any board with a Regular majority. They successfully pressured the Senate committee to shelve
the bill. 48
When the Regulars presented a similar bill in 1890, the alternative practitioners had
already introduced a competing measure that would create separate Allopathic (Regular),
Homeopathic, and Eclectic boards of examiners. The Regulars dismissed this approach as
“ridiculous on its face.” 49 The New York Times disagreed, opining: “The homeopaths and the
eclectics claim the same right to license their own graduates that the different churches possess,
and there does not seem to be any good reason why it should not be conceded to them.” 50
Following the failure of the Regulars’ bill, the orthodox Medical Society grumbled: “Throughout
the length and breadth of the State, circulars and petitions had been scattered, pledges had been
exacted; and when we appeared before the legislative body with our bill, we found the greatest
stumbling-block in the fact that almost every member had been solicited . . . to vote against any
bill which did not include three separate Boards of Examiners.” 51
The legislature instead passed an amended version of the bill pushed by the alternative
sects. The 1890 law established three distinct boards. 52 It mandated a uniform examination for all
license applicants, but with a critical proviso: “in the department of therapeutics, practice and
materia medica the questions shall be in harmony, with the tenets of the school selected by the
candidate.” 53
Interestingly, the Homeopathic and Eclectic schools failed to flourish following their
triumphs in the nation’s licensing wars. With the exception of purist Hahnemannian
Homeopaths, practitioners of these systems essentially melted (both methodologically and
organizationally) into the great mass of Regular physicians. A leading scholar observes: “When

13

homeopathic and Eclectic doctors were shunned and denounced by the regular profession, they
thrived. But the more they gained access to the privileges of regular physicians, the more their
numbers declined. The turn of the century was both the point of acceptance and the moment of
incipient disintegration.” 54
Meanwhile, drugless practitioners and their supporters waged their own largely
successful battle for freedom from licensing restrictions. Unlike the Homeopaths and Eclectics,
Mind Curers, Christian Scientists, and other drugless healers sought total exemption from the
licensing regimes rather than a role in administering them. In their eyes, the requirement that
mental and religious healers be educated and examined in subjects like anatomy and physiology
was self-evidently pointless and thus a barely disguised ploy to suppress their practices
altogether. Judge Clifford Smith remarked: “Of course no one expects that Christian Scientists
will betake themselves to medical colleges to study a system which they do not intend to practise
[sic], and go before a board of medical doctors to ask their official permission to practise
Christian Science. That is not the purpose of such a law.” 55
The legislatures of many states were receptive to such arguments and carved out
exceptions for drugless practitioners in their licensing laws. 56 Four New England states—
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, and New Hampshire—provided the broadest range of
exemptions. The story in Connecticut is illustrative.
On March 8, 1893, the Connecticut House of Representatives held a public hearing on a
licensing bill that provided for a mandatory examination administered by separate Allopathic,
Homeopathic, and Eclectic boards. Prior to the event, a Boston-based organization called the
“National Constitutional Liberty League” disseminated a circular throughout Connecticut urging
“those who would maintain their constitutional liberty of choice of physician or healer [to]
14

personally appear to signify their determination to defend this inherent and inalienable right.” 57
Opponents of the bill flooded the hearing. A reporter observed that “Christian scientists were
there, and those of the faith cure school, and the auditors of the gentler sex were very audible in
their applause.” 58 The bill’s enraged author attacked the Liberty League as the shadowy
puppeteer of the opposition forces. 59
During the hearing, most witnesses testified in support of the bill, emphasizing the need
to protect patients. The exasperated secretary of the Connecticut Board of Health asked, “How
could there be objections to such a bill?” 60 A Homeopathic doctor, speaking in favor of the law,
forcefully rejected the charge that his school “was persecuting others after having been
persecuted itself.” He insisted, “[A]ny physician should know how to detect diseases, to make a
diagnosis and discriminate.” 61 But the hearing was dominated by lawyer, politician, and orator
Joseph L. Barbour, who blasted the bill as a monopolistic plot by regular physicians and an
infringement of personal liberty. He waved petitions against the bill signed by “hundreds of
remonstrants.” 62 The National Constitutional Liberty League later asserted that Barbour’s
presentation “rightfully elicited round after round of irrepressible applause.” 63 The Hartford
Courant observed that “Mr. Barbour . . . made the ‘regulars’ wince.” 64
After the hearing, thousands more signed petitions opposing the bill. 65 One such petition
declared it “unnecessary and unwise to legally forbid further improvement in the healing art, and
deny to posterity the constitutional liberty of choice and the possible benefit of such
improvement.” 66 Additional hearings were similarly mobbed by adversaries of the law. After the
final hearing, the New York Times reported, “The Medical Practice bill . . . has excited greater
interest and opposition than the whole lot of public acts that have been considered since the
session began.” 67
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In the face of such antagonism, supporters of the measure made major amendments so as
to enable its passage. As finally enacted in May 1893, the Connecticut medical licensing law
explicitly stated that it did not apply “to any chiropodist or clairvoyant who does not use in his
practice any drugs, medicines or poison, nor to any person practicing the massage method, or
Swedish movement cure, sun cure, mind cure, magnetic healing, or Christian science, nor to any
other person who does not use or prescribe in his treatment of mankind, drugs, poisons,
medicine, chemicals, or nostrums.” 68
Similar events transpired elsewhere in New England. When the Massachusetts legislature
in 1894 considered a bill requiring healers of all types to be licensed, the protests of William
James and others led it to table the measure and instead pass one with an exemption clause,
similar to Connecticut’s, releasing drugless healers from examination and registration. 69 In 1898,
the Massachusetts legislature considered a bill that would have revoked the exemption for
drugless healers, but following a thronged two-day hearing before the Committee on Public
Health—a hearing highlighted by Williams James’ and William Lloyd Garrison II’s appearances
as witnesses against the amendment—the committee unanimously voted against this change, and
the bill’s supporters backed down. 70 Maine and New Hampshire passed medical practice acts that
echoed Massachusetts’s exemption language almost exactly. 71
Although no medical licensing statutes outside New England included similarly broad
exceptions for drugless practitioners, a growing number of jurisdictions expressly exempted
treatment by prayer generally, or Christian Science in particular. By 1907, Christian Scientists
were exempted from medical licensing in eleven states—a number that would grow to twentyeight by 1917. 72
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This is not to say that Christian Science’s escape was a smooth one. During this same
period, many state legislatures considered—and six enacted—bills designed to suppress the
practice of Christian Science and other drugless therapeutic systems, most commonly by
broadening the range of practitioners subject to their medical practice acts’ examination and
licensing requirements. 73 Moreover, states sometimes prosecuted practitioners and parents for
manslaughter when the Christian Science treatment of a child tragically failed. 74 Nonetheless, the
clear trend was toward noninterference with Christian Scientists and other religious, spiritual,
and mental healers. Indeed, governors vetoed three of the six laws directed against such
practitioners that state legislatures passed. 75 Their veto messages—one of which we will examine
later in this chapter—contained harsh condemnations of medical trusts and ringing defenses of
the right to choose one’s own physician. 76

Juries
Despite activists’ broad success in persuading state legislatures—and, if necessary,
governors—to preserve a zone of freedom for alternative practitioners and their patients, in
various states at various times the licensing laws effectively outlawed much irregular healing.
When practitioners who could not qualify for a license in these jurisdictions chose to continue to
treat patients nonetheless, they faced criminal liability. Fortunately for them, juries tended to be
sympathetic, and few sincere followers of alternative medical approaches were ever actually
fined or imprisoned for practicing without a license.
An analysis of popular views about medical licensing must take into account enforcement
and conviction patterns as well as the law in the books. Because of jurors’ attitudes, Gilded Age
prosecutors had great difficulty convicting, or even indicting, unlicensed alternative
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practitioners. 77 An 1899 treatise on law and medicine observed: “[S]ometimes, especially in rural
districts and small towns . . . both grand and petit jurors, swayed by personal predilections,
decide the issues in violation of their oaths, not upon the testimony, but upon their sentiments or
information extraneous to the case.” 78 One modern researcher has identified only about thirty
criminal cases of any type brought against Christian Scientist practitioners between 1887 and
1915, compared with “scores of others” in which coroners and grand juries failed to indict.” 79 Of
the seventeen juries that issued verdicts in cases charging Christian Scientists with the unlicensed
practice of medicine, only ten found the defendant guilty—even though the state usually had
little trouble establishing the facts in these matters. 80 And these figures do not reflect the
uncountable number of prosecutors who—because of their own sympathy for unlicensed
practitioners or a sense of futility—did not pursue indictments in the first place.
Legislatures responded in various ways to the lax enforcement of medical licensing
statutes. In 1876, the Texas legislature—clearly exasperated by jury nullification—amended its
medical practice act to provide that “it shall be the duty of the Judge . . . to charge the grand jury
with the necessity of preserving this act inviolate, and to admonish them of their duty to find
presentments against any and all persons guilty of its infraction.” 81 Other legislatures appear
simply to have given up; the enactment of many statutory provisions accommodating or
exempting alternative practitioners likely reflected, at least in part, lawmakers’ recognition that
the statutes were not being enforced against them, anyway. 82

The Role of the Courts
Judges, meanwhile, were almost uniformly unreceptive to claims that medical licensing
laws unconstitutionally violated the liberties of practitioners and patients. Elite lawyers and
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judges were, during this era, engaged in their own campaign to control access to the legal
profession through examinations and licensing, and they were thus likely predisposed to support
the parallel efforts of their medical brethren. 83 And even if some judges were nonetheless willing
to find medical licensing statutes unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court largely
extinguished this possibility with its momentous 1889 decision in Dent v. West Virginia. 84
According to an 1881 West Virginia statute, three categories of individuals were entitled
to receive a certificate to practice medicine from the state Board of Health: (1) doctors who had
practiced medicine in the state for at least ten years prior to enactment, (2) graduates of any
“reputable medical college,” and (3) individuals who passed a state examination. When the law
took effect, Dr. Frank Dent and his father were partners in a thriving Newburg, West Virginia,
medical practice founded by Frank’s great-grandfather. 85 Because Frank had been practicing for
only six years and had never attended medical school, he faced the unpleasant prospect of taking
an examination.
Rather than subject himself to such an ordeal, Dent migrated to Kansas and ministered to
patients there. Although he considered himself a Regular physician, he then briefly attended and
earned a degree from the American Medical Eclectic College of Cincinnati (AMEC) in Ohio.
Diploma in hand, he returned home and resumed his Newburg practice. When he presented his
medical degree to the West Virginia Board of Health and demanded a certificate, the board,
populated by Regulars, refused because it deemed AMEC to be not a “reputable medical
college.” Dent continued to treat patients nonetheless and was tried and convicted for the
unlawful practice of medicine. He challenged his conviction on constitutional grounds,
contending that the statute deprived him of his property—his “vested rights and estate in his
profession”—in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 86 The trial
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court and the West Virginia Supreme Court both rejected this argument, so the beleaguered
doctor appealed the matter to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Dent had reason to be optimistic that the nation’s highest tribunal would rule in his favor.
Three years before, the Court had declared, “[T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to
hold his . . . means of living . . . at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.” 87 Justice Stephen Field,
in particular, seemed a likely supporter, for he had repeatedly emphasized the constitutional right
of citizens to practice their professions. 88 For example, in his influential dissent in the 1873
Slaughterhouse Cases, Field had emphatically asserted a fundamental right of every citizen “to
pursue his happiness by following any of the known established trades and occupations of the
country.” 89
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed Dent’s conviction unanimously and without hesitation
in an opinion written by Justice Field himself. Field’s decision is not as surprising as it might
seem. Despite his celebrated paeans to economic liberty, he gave significant latitude to state
legislatures when he concluded they were genuinely trying to protect the safety, health, or morals
of the community pursuant to their valid “police power.” 90 Field’s true aversion was to “special
legislation” or “class legislation”—statutes that, though disguised as neutral exercises of the
police power, were in fact intended to economically advantage particular people or groups. 91 He
simply did not perceive the West Virginia medical practice act to be such a statute.
In Dent, Field reaffirmed “the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any
lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose.” 92 He acknowledged, however, that states
could limit this right if the restrictions were “general in [their] operation,” “appropriate to the . . .
profession,” “attainable by reasonable study or application,” and imposed “for the protection of
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society.” 93 In Field’s view, the West Virginia licensing statute met these tests and was thus
legitimate. He explained:

Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it
than that of medicine. It has to deal with all those subtle and mysterious
influences upon which health and life depend, and requires not only a knowledge
of the properties of vegetable and mineral substances, but of the human body in
all its complicated parts, and their relation to each other, as well as their influence
upon the mind. The physician must be able to detect readily the presence of
disease, and prescribe appropriate remedies for its removal. Every one may have
occasion to consult him, but comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of
learning and skill which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the
assurance given by his license, issued by an authority competent to judge in that
respect, that he possesses the requisite qualifications. 94

Dent virtually destroyed the theory that medical licensing unconstitutionally violated a
physician’s property rights in his trade. 95 Afterward, few litigants even bothered to raise the
point. 96 But Dent did not address the distinct question of whether a medical licensing statute
might be unconstitutional if, as written or applied, it discriminated in favor of the Regulars and
against alternative medical approaches.
At first glance, one might assume that Dent extinguished this theory, as well. After all,
orthodox physicians in West Virginia had championed licensing precisely to drive nonorthodox
practitioners from the field. 97 But a closer look shows that neither the parties nor the justices
viewed the case as having anything to do with discrimination between different medical theories.
The West Virginia statute at issue was explicitly nondiscriminatory; under pressure from
concerned citizens, the legislature in 1882 had amended it to state that a qualifying diploma be
issued by a “reputable medical college in the school of medicine to which the person desiring to
practice belongs.” 98 Furthermore, Dent never claimed that the Board of Health, in violation of
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this provision, had rejected his diploma because it was from an Eclectic institution.
Consequently, the question of unconstitutional discrimination between sects was never before the
Court.
It is unclear why Dent did not advance such a claim. 99 Perhaps Marmaduke Dent, Frank’s
cousin and attorney, concluded that any focus on AMEC’s “reputability” would harm rather than
help his client. The real problem was that AMEC was at best a fly-by-night, second-rate
institution and perhaps a completely fraudulent diploma mill.100 Marmaduke might have framed
the case differently—indeed, the board might not have denied Frank’s application in the first
place—if Frank had earned his degree from the Eclectic Medical Institute, Cincinnati’s largest
medical school and the most respected Eclectic institution in the country. 101
It is interesting to imagine how Justice Field, the nemesis of special legislation, would
have ruled if Dent had presented a well-supported medical discrimination claim. A careful
reading of the passage from Dent quoted above suggests that while Field recognized the validity
of requiring physicians to have a minimum extent of experience or knowledge, he would not
have endorsed a licensing scheme that privileged doctrinaire orthodox medicine. The opinion
refers to medicine not as a settled or certain science, but rather as one concerning “subtle and
mysterious influences.” Field’s reference to “vegetable and mineral substances” implies that he
deemed the former, favored by the Eclectics, to be as useful as the latter, preferred by the
Regulars. Furthermore, his obscure, perhaps inverted, reference to the body’s “influence upon
the mind” indicates that he recognized the potential validity of non-materialistic approaches to
disease like Mind Cure and Christian Science.
Stephen Field’s personal medical history made him skeptical about, and perhaps
downright contemptuous of, the Regular profession. As a young man, he bashed his knee against
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a cart wheel and developed a serious infection. His physician—apparently a Regular doctor with
a “heroic” bent—dosed him with calomel, a mercury-based purgative commonly used in
orthodox medicine. The treatment almost killed him. 102 The damaged knee bothered and hobbled
Field for the rest of his life, and, according to his family, he always believed that the injury’s
severity resulted “principally . . . from the medicine taken.” 103 The “eminent surgeons” Field
consulted provided him “very little relief.” 104 Field thus resorted to hydropathy, visiting
“different watering-places whose waters were supposed to possess healing virtues.” 105
In short, there is good reason to suspect that Justice Field—personally distrustful of
orthodox medicine, disdainful of discriminatory special legislation, and suspicious of
anticompetitive schemes disguised as public health measures—would have deemed a medical
licensing scheme to be unconstitutional if it reserved the profession for Regulars. He never
confronted such a measure, however.
After Dent, some lower court judges, unlike Field, had the opportunity to rule on claims
of unconstitutional medical discrimination. They were not as sympathetic as Field might have
been. For example, a magnetic healer argued that Indiana’s medical educational requirements
represented unjust and arbitrary discrimination in violation of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. 106 A Christian Science practitioner contended that Ohio’s licensing law was
unconstitutional because “it discriminates against Christian Science, or in favor of certain
schools of medicine” by requiring “the Christian Scientist . . . [to] take the same examination as
the regular practitioner, in other words, [to] understand the use of drugs and medicines, none of
which, according to his system, does he ever use.” 107 These challenges all failed. Even the few
courts that recognized or assumed that medical nondiscrimination was a cognizable
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constitutional interest refused to hold that uniform educational and testing mandates actually
constituted unconstitutional discrimination. 108
The judiciary’s general resistance to medical discrimination claims is epitomized by the
1898 case Dowdell v. McBride in the Texas Court Appeals. Dowdell, an Eclectic doctor, attacked
the state’s licensing statute as unconstitutional because it required that the board of medical
examiners be composed entirely of graduates of medical schools endorsed by the AMA. He
seemed particularly well positioned to win such a claim. Unlike Dent, he had earned his diploma
from the respected Eclectic Medical Institute of Cincinnati. Moreover, he based his claim not on
the U.S. Constitution, but on a provision of the Texas Constitution which explicitly mandated
that “no preference shall ever be given by law to any school of medicine.” 109 Nevertheless,
Dowdell lost too.
Outside the constitutional context, courts occasionally demonstrated sympathy for
freedom of therapeutic choice. Their instrument for doing so was statutory interpretation. In
cases in which unlicensed drugless practitioners were prosecuted for the unauthorized practice of
medicine, some judges held that the defendant’s conduct did not constitute the “practice of
medicine.” State licensing laws contained a variety of definitions of this phrase, and in many
instances no definition at all. 110 When faced with either ambiguity or silence, courts tended—
especially in cases involving Christian Scientists—to interpret this language so as to acquit
unlicensed healers.
Judges initially did not exercise such leniency. In an 1894 case called State v. Buswell,
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that Christian Science practitioners were covered by the state’s
medical practice act. 111 That statute imposed licensing on anybody “who shall operate on,
profess to heal, or prescribe for or otherwise treat any physical or mental ailment of another.”
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Rejecting the defendant’s argument that the law regulated only practitioners of “medicine,
surgery, or obstetrics, as generally or usually understood,” the court concluded that the statute’s
“provisions are not limited to those who attempt to follow beaten paths and established
usages.” 112
Shortly afterwards, however, a Christian Science practitioner achieved a favorable result
in a similar case in Rhode Island. In State v. Mylod, decided in 1898, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court limited the meaning of the “practice of medicine” in the state’s licensing statute to its
“popular understanding.” The court explained that in common parlance, the “practice of
medicine” requires “a knowledge of disease, its origin, its anatomical and physiological features,
and its causative relations; and, further, it requires a knowledge of drugs, their preparation and
action.” Therefore, “Prayer . . . does not constitute the practice of medicine in the popular
sense.” 113 The court further opined that a nondiscrimination clause in the statute (“nothing in this
chapter shall be so construed as to discriminate against any particular school or system of
medicine”) compelled an exemption for Christian Scientists. In light of this provision, it would
be “absurd,” the court concluded, to subject members of a healing system to requirements with
which they could not comply, “thus adopting a construction which would operate not as a
discrimination only, but as a prohibition.” 114 Fortunately for Christian Scientists and other
mental and religious healers, the Mylod decision proved to be far more influential than
Buswell. 115
On occasion, a judge construing the meaning of the “practice of medicine” would
transcend the technical analysis of statutory interpretation and declare the importance of medical
liberty. For example, in Bennett v. Ware, the Georgia Court of Appeals justified its holding that a
“Magic Healer” was not “practicing medicine” by asserting that limiting the phrase to those who
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prescribed drugs was “the better rule and one more in consonance with reason and in harmony
with the republican character of our institutions.”116 The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State
v. Biggs, concluded that the federal and state constitutions dictated that the state’s licensing
requirement not apply to a drugless practitioner who treated patients with physical manipulation
and dietary advice. The court proclaimed: “In the cure of bodies, as in the cure of souls,
‘orthodoxy is my doxy, heterodoxy is the other man’s doxy’ . . . . This is a free country, and any
man has a right to be treated by any system he chooses.” 117
Biggs may be the only judicial decision of the Gilded Age to conclude that mandatory
licensing of drugless practitioners violated the United States Constitution. This is not to say,
however, that the era’s battle against medical licensing was not a successful “constitutional”
movement. Medical liberty advocates routinely advanced constitutional arguments outside of
court, and there they often found receptive audiences.

Constitutional Rhetoric Outside of Court
According to Larry Kramer, “the years between Reconstruction and the New Deal were
. . . a kind of golden age for popular constitutionalism: a time rife with popular movements
mobilizing support for change by invoking constitutional arguments and traditions that neither
depended upon nor recognized—and often denied—imperial judicial authority.” 118 The Gilded
Age struggles over medical licensing strongly support Kramer’s assertion. The courts’ refusal to
strike down licensing on constitutional grounds did not dissuade campaigners for medical liberty
from articulating explicit constitutional arguments in legislative chambers and the public sphere.
For example, opponents of the 1893 medical licensing bill in Connecticut claimed, in the words
of an observer, that the law “would trespass upon the rights of the individual; that its purport
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[sic] is hostile to the spirit of our institutions, and that its enactment would be illegal and its
enforcement unconstitutional.” 119 In his magazine The Arena, Benjamin O. Flower—one of the
period’s leading proponents of medical freedom—characterized medical licensing statutes as
“unjust and un-American legislation which makes unfair distinctions and unconstitutional
discriminations.” 120 The constitutional essence of the anti-licensing cause was reflected in the
very name of one of its leading organizations: the National Constitutional Liberty League.
In these extrajudicial arenas, Gilded Age anti-licensing activists invoked the nation’s
fundamental values much more frequently than particular constitutional proscriptions. But like
their antebellum forebears, they considered themselves to be making “constitutional” arguments
when doing so. Their Constitution was not simply the collection of provisions contained in the
document itself, but also the broad principles of freedom and equality that the Founding Fathers
proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, fought a war to vindicate, and reiterated in the
Constitution’s preamble. One modern scholar, Mark Tushnet, has influentially called this bundle
of foundational values the “thin Constitution.” 121
Gilded Age medical freedom literature contained ubiquitous references to the Declaration
of Independence’s “inalienable rights” of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Henry
Wood, for example, characterized these rights as “constitutional guarantees” that embraced “the
right of individual judgment in regard to . . . interior, sacred, personal experiences and choices.”
He concluded, “Society robs one of all these when . . . it makes one’s irregular healer . . . a
criminal.” 122 When Alzine A. Chevaillier declared that “the right of a man to save his body from
disease and death . . . certainly is ‘a pursuit of happiness,’” she mistakenly assigned this phrase
to the Constitution itself. 123
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Like their antebellum counterparts, Gilded Age medical licensing foes often portrayed
their cause as a continuation of the American Revolution. After the anti-licensing forces’ 1898
victory in Massachusetts, the Boston Transcript cheered: “The regulars are as signally whipped
as they were at Bunker Hill.” 124 Benjamin Flower proudly asserted that “the spirit of ’76 was still
abroad in the land.” 125 J. W. Lockhart reached back even further in history. He wrote that the
notion that “people are not capable of choosing their own medical advisers” was “refuted at
Runnymede when the Magna Charta was forced from King James, . . . at Independence Hall
when the Liberty Bell pealed forth the joyous proclamation of political, religious and social
freedom; when the Declaration of Independence proclaimed the ‘inalienable rights of man’ and
when the Fourteenth Amendment was incorporated into the organic law of this country.” 126
Some anti-licensing advocates proceeded more legalistically. Robert Chapin Bayly, for
example, cited a grab-bag of specific constitutional provisions in his writings. He invoked the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I’s
prohibition against ex post facto laws. 127 He contended that Article IV’s Full Faith and Credit
and Privileges and Immunities Clauses prohibited one state from denying the right to practice to
a physician authorized to do so in another. 128 He even unconvincingly contended that medical
licensing violated the Article IV provision that obligates the United States to “guarantee to every
state . . . a republican form of government.” 129 Ultimately, however, even Bayly favored broad
incantations of American’s fundamental rights—the “great principles of organic law transmitted
to us by the Fathers of the Republic.” He argued that state medical practice acts were illegitimate
under guarantees “emphatically declared in the Declaration of Independence before the
Constitution was made.” 130
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The Four Strands of Medical Freedom
When elaborating on such arguments, Gilded Age medical licensing opponents invoked
the same four strands of liberty as did their antebellum forebears: bodily freedom, economic
freedom, freedom of belief, and freedom of inquiry. The rhetoric of the two periods differed,
however, particularly with respect to the relative emphasis given to these different themes.

Bodily Freedom
Before the Civil War, an important trope in anti-licensing literature was the appalling
image of a patient who, denied access to botanical cures, had no choice but to subject his or her
body to the brutal, debilitating, and “unnatural” remedies administered by Regular doctors. As
orthodox medicine became less “heroic” during the course of the nineteenth century, this
scenario became increasingly implausible and licensing foes raised it much less often. It did not
vanish altogether, however. An opponent of the 1893 Connecticut measure extending licensing
to drugless practitioners fretted, “I am anxious for the defeat of this bill that I may have the
liberty … of employing a doctor who, I feel sure, will give me no arsenic, strychnine, corrosive
sublimate, rattlesnake virus, nor any other deadly thing.” 131 Alexander Wilder, a physician,
journalist, and prominent medical libertarian, warned: “If it is imagined that the blood-letting
practise [sic] has disappeared, not to return, we have only to remember that there are recurrences
of epidemic ‘fads’ among medical men.” 132
Increasingly, though, those opposed to licensing alternative practitioners focused less on
the right to avoid unwanted remedies and more on the right to access one’s preferred treatments
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and advisors. Wilder remarked, “It would be an act of tyranny to force a person to take medicine
if he did not believe in its efficacy, and it is equally such to compel him to do without advice and
service where he does so believe.” 133 Christian Scientist Herbert W. Packard contended: “When
we come to the right to seek and preserve health, we come to a right than which there is none
more sacred, for it is an axiom that self-preservation is the first law of nature.” 134 In his 1894
letter to the Transcript, William James condemned “paternalism so solicitous . . . as to stand
between [the citizen] and the therapeutic adviser whom he would naturally select.” 135
Sometimes, activists linked medical freedom to a broader vision of bodily freedom, as
well as to a general right of personal autonomy. Herbert Packard insisted that the state had no
more right to interfere with one’s choice of medical advisors than “to prescribe the kind of food a
man shall eat, the clothes he shall wear, or the work he shall engage in.” 136 Reverend Benjamin
Fay Mills, testifying against the extension of medical licensing at the 1898 Massachusetts
hearing, proclaimed: “You might as well say that a man should not walk on the slippery part of
the sidewalk, or that he should eat boiled meat and not fried.” 137 More than a century before
adversaries of the 2010 Affordable Care Act compared that law’s health insurance mandate to
requiring people to eat broccoli, these men were voicing similar arguments against medical
licensing. 138
The Gilded Age literature foreshadowed modern bodily freedom rhetoric in other ways,
as well. For example, in his letter to the Transcript, James declared: “If the word ‘sacred’ can be
applied to any personal right, surely the right to treat one’s own body as one chooses may claim
the title.” 139 Similar language would reappear some seventy years later in the arguments of the
abortion rights movement. For example, in 1973, an amicus brief filed by pro-choice groups in
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Roe v. Wade asserted, “Surely none of the rights can be seen as more basic, fundamental or
worthy of protection than a woman's right to control her body . . . .” 140
It is thus important to take special note of this strain of advocacy in the Gilded Age antilicensing literature, for such arguments retain a currency today that most of the others advanced
then do not.

Economic Freedom
Many Gilded Age political reformers were inveterately suspicious that statutes,
regardless of their ostensible goals, were “special legislation” or “class legislation” intended
mainly to benefit the legislators’ wealthy patrons. These reformers routinely opposed state
interventions in the free market that they perceived to be promoting the interests of particular
individuals or groups. Examples of such legislation included laws restricting trade, distributing
bounties to industry, or creating artificial monopolies. Like the Jacksonians before them, Gilded
Age reformers condemned special legislation not only as unwise policy, but also as a violation of
Americans’ fundamental liberties. 141
This is the lens through which late-nineteenth-century medical freedom activists viewed
medical licensing. They considered the postbellum proliferation of medical practice acts to be a
corrupt plot by Regular physicians to exclude competitors from the market. Alexander Wilder
asserted that “legislators who vote for such enactments are little else than dupes of those who
seek them” and that “many of the bills were stolen through the legislatures when no one was on
the watch.” The licensing laws, he said, reflected nothing more than “[l]ust of power and lust of
gain.” 142 R. C. Bayly described these statutes as “a sample of the worst and most damnable class
legislation on record in any free country.” He asserted that “legalized cormorants . . . have
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entered into a conspiracy, widespread as the United States, to maintain a kind of medical
trust.” 143
The allegation of a “medical trust” was a common and significant feature of Gilded Age
medical freedom literature. Resistance to government-supported monopolies in private trades
had deep roots in American libertarian thought. 144 Hence, when William Lloyd Garrison II (the
son of the great abolitionist) testified against expanding licensing requirements at the 1898
Massachusetts hearing, he drew from a deep well of indignation when he contended: “Ostensibly
an act to protect the community from malpractice, in reality its motive is to restrict competition
and secure the monopoly of treating disease to those who bear the credentials of an established
and recognized school.” 145 In an article titled “Socialistic Medical Legislation,” J. W. Lockhart
made clear that basic liberties were at stake. “The medical monopoly, like all other monopolies,
is socialistic . . . in the matter of preventing competition and maintaining large fee bills, and
despotic in regard to all other matters pertaining to the public health.” 146
As illustrated by Justice Field’s opinion in Dent, even those fiercely opposed to special
legislation acknowledged there was a sphere of legitimate police power. But laissez-faire
constitutionalists frequently dismissed the purported public health goals of legislation and
ascribed its passage to selfish ulterior motives instead. For instance, in the famous 1905 case
Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court struck down a maximum hours law for bakers,
observing: “[M]any of the laws of this character, while passed under what is claimed to be the
police power for the purpose of protecting the public health and welfare, are, in reality, passed
from other motives.” 147
Medical freedom activists expressed similar suspicions about medical licensing statutes.
Indeed, Herbert Packard attacked them by quoting this very passage from Lochner. 148 Wilder
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similarly observed: “When protection [of the people] is talked about it is time to be on the
lookout for jobbery and trickery.” 149 Bayly maintained: “I have not known of one instance where
[medical licensing] laws were enforced for the protection of the people. Such laws are always
championed through the legislature by political scoundrels in the interest of some nefarious
combination or trust directly opposed to the welfare . . . of people and to all free government.”150
Such cocksure rejections of the possibility of a genuine health motivation for medical licensing
may seem paranoid to us today, but it is important to remember that at the time, orthodox
medicine was not clearly more efficacious than its rivals. Moreover, most states did not prohibit
unlicensed practitioners from providing services for free, and this curious exception heightened
suspicions that the medical practice acts’ true purpose was to protect the Regulars’ market share,
rather than the public health. 151
Medical freedom proponents also contended that licensing laws violated the individual
economic rights of practitioners and patients. In the late-nineteenth-century, opposition to
legislation outside the police power and the preservation of individual liberty were two sides of
the same coin. 152 Like other proponents of laissez-faire, medical licensing foes believed that
invalid assertions of the police power always constituted unconstitutional invasions of economic
freedom, including the “freedom to practice a trade” and “liberty of contract.” Bayly thus
contended: “The State Board of Health has no more authority to regulate the practice of medicine
than it has the common business of any other class of people in the State. The State, in the
exercise of its police power, has no authority whatever to deprive a citizen of the United States of
the right to freely engage in the business of his choice, provided, that the rights of others are not
infringed.” 153 And Wilder asserted: “Of the right of an individual to make his own contracts
there can be no rational question. He may engage whomsoever he pleases to cure him; and the
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person, having rendered a meritorious service, has a moral right to a reasonable
compensation.” 154
Although the economic freedom arguments of Gilded Age medical licensing foes
resembled those of their antebellum counterparts, they lacked the same populist tone.
Thomsonianism, rooted in Jacksonian thought, was primarily a rural and working-class
phenomenon. Its followers portrayed Regular doctors as an elitist and intellectually pretentious
cabal plundering the common folk. By contrast, as we have seen, many of the later alternative
medical approaches attracted adherents from the educated middle and upper classes. Medical
freedom activists associated with these schools were thus much less likely to vilify Regular
doctors for their wealth or challenge the value of education and expertise. Nevertheless, like
other Gilded Age reformers emerging from the subculture of well-bred urban professionals,
campaigners against medical licensing utterly despised special legislation as a matter of
principle. And to them, medical practice acts were a prime example of such legislation, the
product of a corrupt alliance between a powerful interest group and unscrupulous party
politicians. 155 Although the era’s stock villains were corporate plutocrats, not Regular
physicians, medical freedom proponents saw little difference between the two.
Overall, economic freedom arguments were somewhat less prominent in Gilded Age
medical freedom literature than they had been in Thomsonian writings. As we will see below,
many anti-medical licensing activists began to embrace the need for widespread economic
regulation, even as they continue to assail licensing in particular. But even those who began to
feel less comfortable with the language of economic laissez-faire had no ambivalence at all about
the two remaining strands of medical freedom: freedom of belief and freedom of inquiry.
Freedom of Belief
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The antebellum Thomsonians likened orthodox doctors to despotic priests, compared
medical licensing to the establishment of a state religion, and sometimes condemned government
restrictions on medical practice as a violation of their freedom of “conscience.” Overall,
however, freedom of belief in general—and freedom of religion in particular—played a much
larger role in medical liberty arguments after the Civil War than before. This change in rhetoric
was due largely to the increasing importance of spirituality in the alternative medical systems
themselves. Thomsonianism did not have a strong link to religion, and its followers did not
invoke the healing power of spiritual or divine forces. 156 By contrast, such forces were integral
components of many later alternative movements. 157 Hahnemannian homeopaths ascribed
“spiritual power” to their drastically diluted medicines. 158 And for followers of drugless
approaches such as Mind Cure and Christian Science, cure of the body was virtually inseparable
from cure of the soul.
The post-Civil War struggle against medical licensing was thus led by people who
vigorously rejected the purely materialistic approach of Regular medicine. Judge Thomas E.
Grover, testifying on behalf of the Boston Metaphysical Club at the 1898 Massachusetts hearing,
declared that “there is a close, . . . unknown and unexplained connection between the unseen
mind and the visible body.” 159 At the same hearing, Reverend T. E. Allen testified:

It is notorious that many physicians are confirmed materialists, convinced . . . that
… man is wholly material and death ends all. Over against this, we find that the
heretical healing schools believe that man is an immortal spirit…. Believing this,
then, as a part of their religious systems, their theories of healing are dominated
by the same idea, and they necessarily attach more importance to the operation of
spiritual and mental forces than do many others in the community. It follows,
therefore, that they either attach less importance to the use of drugs, or deny their
efficacy or utility altogether. 160
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To those for whom physical and spiritual health were inextricably linked, medical
freedom was essentially indistinguishable from freedom of belief. And in their view, it was
precisely medicine’s basis in faith rather than science that made government regulation of it
inappropriate. As Herbert Packard argued: “[I]n matters about which there is a right to exercise
judgment and discretion, and about which men are not agreed, and have not come to definite and
fixed conclusions, the majority of the people, through the legislature, cannot substitute their
judgment and opinion for that of their fellowmen and make them conform thereto, without
depriving men of natural and unalienable rights protected under the Constitution.” 161
Although Gilded Age medical licensing opponents frequently asserted violations of a
generalized freedom of belief, they were more hesitant to claim infringements of religious liberty
in particular. The worldviews with which many drugless healing systems overlapped, such as
Transcendentalism, Swedenborgianism, and Theosophy, were not religious creeds so much as
amalgams of philosophical, mystical, and religious ideas. 162 Many advocates thus analogized
medical and religious liberty rather than equated them. But religious themes were prominent in
the literature nonetheless. Bayly proclaimed, “[T]he establishment of a State system of medicine
… is just as tyrannical in its methods, as subversive of the liberty and rights of the citizens, as
any system of religion backed by the civil power, ever dared to be.” 163 Flower declared: “The
right of every man to employ whomsoever he desires in matters pertaining to his physical health
is as sacred as his right to employ whosoever he desires to minister to his spiritual welfare.”164
Occasionally, in an effort to blur the distinction between medical and religious freedom,
licensing foes mentioned the healing activities of Bible figures. Joseph Barbour, for instance,
ended his testimony at the 1893 Connecticut legislative hearing by remarking that under the
proposed law, St. Peter would have been prosecuted for healing the lame man at the Temple. 165
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With Christian Science, medicine and religion seemed indivisibly intertwined. However,
even the Scientists only gradually began to condemn government interference with its
practitioners primarily as a violation of religious liberty. 166 The early Scientists—including,
initially, Mary Baker Eddy herself—tended to view their movement as a healing system more
than as a religion. As one historian observes, “Although there appeared to be a symbiotic
relationship between sin and sickness in Christian Science . . . the practical reality was that most
people initially came to Science for a cure from sickness.” 167
The Scientists remained conflicted about how to classify their rights into the twentieth
century. Consider, for example, two nearly contiguous articles in the 1905 volume of the
Christian Science Journal addressing the constitutionality of licensing Christian Science
practitioners. In his contribution, Herbert Packard discussed the movement as a “system of
healing” and contended that there is a “right to seek and preserve health” in our “fundamental
principles of government.” A few pages later, by contrast, Clifford Smith depicted Christian
Science first and foremost as a “system of religious teaching” and based his argument against
licensing chiefly on “the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.” 168
Invocations of religious liberty were clearly ascendant, however. 169 When Nebraska
Governor John Mickey vetoed a licensing bill the same year, he asserted: “In the Christian
Science religion the ideas of worship and of divine healing are so intermingled that it is
impossible to draw the line of demarcation, and hence interference with the one is an interference
with ‘the rights of conscience’ and thus becomes an infringement of the constitutional guaranty
of religious freedom.” 170 After the New Hampshire Supreme Court definitively characterized
Christian Science as a religion in a 1912 dispute concerning Eddy’s will, Scientists usually relied
principally on religious freedom arguments. 171
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Freedom of Inquiry
The thronged State House in Boston must have buzzed with excitement as William James
rose to address the Committee on Public Health on March 2, 1898. The Harvard professor was
there to testify against the bill that would have extended medical licensing to drugless
practitioners. 172 He opened by reminding the committee of his Harvard medical degree and his
long record of teaching scientific subjects at the university. He quipped: “The presumption is that
I am . . . interested in Science. I am indeed; and it is, in fact, because I see in this bill . . . a
movement in favor of ignorance, that I am here to oppose it. It will inevitably trammel the
growth of medical experience and knowledge.” 173
In his testimony, James went on to articulate themes that, four years later, he would
develop at length in his masterpiece The Varieties of Religious Experience—a book that included
a lengthy discussion of Mind Cure. 174 One such theme was the contingency of truth. Although
James did not, in his testimony, directly deny the possibility of objective medical truth, he flirted
with this conclusion by suggesting that medical knowledge was in a state of permanent flux.
“Both as to principle and as to practice our knowledge is deplorably imperfect. The whole face
of medicine changes unexpectedly from one generation to another . . . .” James characterized
medicine as a collection of “vital mysteries,” “personal relations of doctor and patient,” and
“infinitely subtle operations of nature.” Whereas licensing might be appropriate if medicine were
a “finished science,” it had not nearly achieved this status. 175
The other main theme of James’s testimony—one that he also elaborated on in
Varieties—was the idea that practical experience is the only valid measure of medical truth.
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“Whatever you do,” he urged the committee, “you are bound not to obstruct the growth of truth
by the freest gathering of the most various experiences.” He mocked Regular and Homeopathic
medicine for their mutual refusal to consider experiential evidence of the efficacy of the other,
noting that their conflict was more akin to a disagreement between philosophers or “theologists”
than one between scientists. He then rebuked the Regulars for taking the same dismissive stance
toward Mind Cure:

One would suppose that any [set] of sane persons interested in the growth of medical
truth would rejoice if other persons were found willing to push out their experiences in
the mental-healing direction, and provide a mass of material out of which the conditions
and limits of such therapeutic methods at last become clear. . . . [B]ut instead of
rejoicing, [Regular doctors] adopt the fiercely partisan attitude of a powerful trades
union, demanding legislation against the competition of the “scabs.”

James attacked the licensing bill on the grounds that “the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts is not a medical body, has no right to a medical opinion, and should not dare to
take sides in a medical controversy.” He urged the legislature to stay its hand in view of “the
confusion, the deplorable imperfection of the most expert knowledge, . . . the conscientious
divergences of opinion, the infinite complication of the phenomena, and the varying and
mutually exclusive fields of experience.” The measure under consideration, he contended, would
“convert the laws of this Commonwealth into obstacles to the acquisition of truth” by destroying
“a whole department of medical investigation . . . together with the special conditions of freedom
under which it flourishes.”
James did not scorn Regular medicine. Indeed, he conceded that if forced to choose only
one type of practitioner, “I should unhesitatingly vote to license the Harvard Medical School
type.” Such a choice was unnecessary, however. Massachusetts should continue allowing the
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Mind Curers to do their work, because “[o]ur state needs the assistance of every type of mind,
academic and nonacademic.” And if mental healers proved incapable of adequately interpreting
their own results, “why then let the orthodox M. D.’s follow up their facts and study and interpret
them. But to force the mind curers to a State examination is to kill the experiments outright.”
Unlike his 1894 letter to the Transcript, James’s 1898 testimony focused almost
exclusively on freedom of inquiry, and he promoted this concept chiefly on utilitarian grounds
rather than out of concern for individual rights. He stated that his duty was to “the larger society,
the commonwealth” and to the “real interests of medicine.” James’s testimony was nonetheless a
strong libertarian statement. “Above all things,” James concluded,” let us not be infected with
the Gallic spirit of regulation and reglementation [sic] for their own abstract sakes.”
Following James’s address, freedom of inquiry became perhaps the most common theme
in American anti-licensing literature. Just three months later, Benjamin Flower wrote an article
opposing medical licensing in which he extensively quoted the testimony and concluded,
“Medical freedom . . . fosters science and aids progress; and the safety of the people is conserved
under freedom.” 176 A few years later, Alexander Wilder opined: “The concept that medical or
other progress may be promoted by restrictive laws is absolutely contrary to the experience of
mankind. It is not possible to devise any kind of government handcuff . . . that can help
progress.” 177
Such reasoning appealed to the early twentieth century’s rising progressive impulse,
which, at least in some of its manifestations, was concerned with societal improvement more
than with individual rights. Medical freedom activists continued passionately to advance
arguments based on personal liberty as well. But as we will see in the next chapter, the
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contention that unrestricted medical inquiry generated community-wide health benefits would be
an extremely important addition to their rhetorical arsenal in the Progressive Age.

Governor Thomas’s Veto Message
In 1899, Colorado Governor Charles Spaulding Thomas vetoed a bill that would have
subjected drugless practitioners to a state medical licensing system administered by a composite
board comprising Regular physicians, Homeopaths, and Eclectics. Thomas’ veto message is one
of the best examples of a document weaving together all of the Gilded Age’s main strands of
medical freedom.
Thomas began by emphasizing the uncertainty of medical knowledge. He contended that
in its current state, “[M]edicine is not a science. . . . It is a series of experiments more or less
successful, and will become a science only when the laws of health and disease are fully
ascertained and understood.” Building on this theme, Thomas stressed the importance of freedom
of inquiry. Parroting James’s testimony of the previous year, the governor called for “unfettered”
medical investigation. He asserted that medical knowledge would be advanced “not by arresting
the progress of experiment, and binding men down to hard and fast rules of treatment, but by
giving free rein to the man who departs from the beaten highway and discovers hidden methods
and remedies in the wayside.” Thomas remarked that without prior experimentation, “the leech,
the lancet, and the pill-box would still be the regulators of the public health.” He warned:
“Innovation and experiment will always languish when held in thralldom by the censorship of a
powerful commission founded upon a rigid and exacting statute.”
Thomas next highlighted his concern for economic liberty. He denied the state’s authority
to “deprive practitioners . . . of the right to continue their business.” Demonstrating the
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continuing pull of economic freedom arguments in the Gilded Age, Thomas declared that “if
[medical practitioners’] livelihood can be made to depend upon such oppressive conditions, the
independences of the individual must disappear, and servitude in its worst form will inevitably
follow.” The governor claimed that he would have vetoed the bill even if it actually advanced the
public health, “for disease is . . . preferable to the unrestricted power of punishment and
confiscation.” But the legislature’s references to health were in fact a “subterfuge.” After all, he
observed, “all measures designed to promote a specific interest or protect an existing evil are
ostensibly labeled ‘for the benefit of the people.’” The true goal of the licensing bill was to
establish a “medical trust . . . which shall regulate demand and supply by absolute control of the
product which forms its basis.”
Finally, Thomas turned to bodily freedom and freedom of belief, which—in a move
typical of his era—he blended into a single line of argument. “The fundamental vice of the bill,”
he maintained, “is that it denies absolutely to the individual the right to select his own physician.
This is a right of conscience, and is that which enables the citizen to worship God as he may
desire. It is indeed the same right manifesting itself in a parallel direction.” Thomas emphasized
that the preservation of this right would benefit citizens’ bodily health, for “[c]onfidence of the
patient in the healer does more to restore him than all the drugs that ever medicined [sic] man.”
The governor pointed out that followers of drugless healing “recognize a subtle psychic force in
mental healing, a power to overcome disease by the operation of mind and personal influence,”
and he insisted that “the cures they narrate are not imaginary.” He asked, “Shall the government
enact by statutes that these people shall not longer enjoy their beliefs or put them into daily
practice?”
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Gilded Age Medical Libertarianism
Notably, Governor Thomas did not confine his argument to these distinct strands of
medical freedom. Near the end of his veto message, he broadly declared that the medical
licensing bill, “like all kindred forms of paternalism, assumes that the citizen cannot take care of
himself. The States must lead him as a little child, lest he fall into trouble unawares.… Such a
system . . . crumbles into ashes in the crucible of experience.” 178 Thomas thus nodded toward a
comprehensive libertarian philosophy of a type never quite voiced by the antebellum
Thomsonians. Other medical licensing opponents routinely made similar statements. William
James, for example, insisted that the “Massachusetts principle has always been to allow freedom
of choice in personal matters and to let the citizen bear the consequences.” 179
Gilded Age medical licensing foes drew from various intellectual and cultural sources in
forging this all-embracing libertarian worldview. One was the English political theorist Herbert
Spencer. American medical freedom advocates enthusiastically adopted the “first principle” that
Spencer articulated in his 1851 book Social Statics: “Every man has freedom to do all that he
wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.” 180 Spencer himself
elaborated this principle into a condemnation of slavery, economic regulation, censorship, state
religion, women’s inequality—and medical licensing. 181 Americans frequently borrowed from
Spencer in their own jeremiads against medical licensing. 182 Reverend Allen, for example,
stated: “The essence of liberty is to allow each person to follow his own choice wherever he may
do so without infringing the equal liberty of others. The instance you say ‘I will give you liberty
to do the thing that appears right or wise in my eyes,’ you enter upon a policy of coercion, and
become at heart a tyrant.” 183 Clifford Smith suggested, anachronistically, that the Founding
Fathers were Spencerians: “The purposes of government will not be carried out in accordance
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with the principles of the Declaration of Independence, unless all men are guaranteed . . . the
equal right to protection under the law in the enjoyment of individual liberty, so far as it can be
secured without depriving others of substantially the same degree of freedom and
opportunity.” 184
Spencer’s own attack on medical licensing had a ruthless, survival-of-the-fittest
justification: “Unpitifying [sic] as it looks, it is best to let the foolish man suffer the appointed
penalty of his foolishness.” 185 American licensing opponents assiduously avoided quoting this
merciless language. Instead, they asserted, like Alexander Wilder, “Our American fellowcitizens are intelligent and able to take care of themselves, and need no such babying and
swaddling by government.” 186 In addition, the Americans portrayed medical choice as just one
aspect of a more general freedom of choice implicit in the United States’ democratic system.
Henry Wood explained: “Democracy takes it for granted that citizens are not imbeciles but free,
intelligent moral agents. Within proper limits, they are to exercise the power of choice . . . even
where the choosing may not always be the best.” 187
As demonstrated by these passages, American medical freedom activists did not simply
borrow arguments from Spencer. They also drew ideas and inspiration from a homegrown
tradition of antistatism. This ideology of “radical libertarianism” 188 emphasized the protection of
individual autonomy against invasion by state authorities. In the antebellum years, this
worldview was evident not only among Thomsonians, but also among abolitionists, labor
reformers, women’s rights advocates, and freethinkers. 189 In the decades following the Civil
War, the somewhat diminished but still-strong cohort of radical libertarians embraced medical
freedom as one of a cluster of causes that also included women’s rights, anti-imperialism,
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freedom of speech, and sexual freedom (including access to contraceptives). 190 They carried
these views into the twentieth century.
Consider, for example, the leading medical freedom activist Benjamin Flower, who lived
from 1858 to 1918. As a young man, he “came under the spell of Herbert Spencer and
abandoned himself to the perils of free thought.” 191 He embraced the Mind Cure movement,
explored spiritualism, and helped found the American Psychic Society. 192 His libertarianism
extended well beyond medical issues. He echoed abolitionist Wendell Phillips’ call for “[e]ntire
unshackled freedom for every man’s life, no matter what his doctrine—the safety of free
discussion, no matter how wide its range.” 193 Throughout his career as an editor and
commentator, Flower was an exponent of freedom of speech, academic freedom, religious
toleration, and women’s rights. 194 His dedication to the last of these extended not only to
suffrage and property rights, but also to access to contraceptives, because women should be
“given absolute control of their bodies.” 195
Or consider William Lloyd Garrison II, who lived from 1838 to 1909. He grew up
immersed in his father’s abolitionist philosophy and community and fought for the African
Americans’ rights until his death. 196 He also became an ardent proponent of women’s rights and
a passionate anti-imperialist. 197 Underlying all these positions were Garrison’s commitment to
the freedom of every individual and his fierce opposition to “the enthronement of privilege in
fundamental law.” 198
Interestingly, at least some Gilded Age medical licensing foes eventually strayed from
libertarian orthodoxy in one very important respect—namely, their attitude toward economic
regulation. In the 1890s, as they confronted the social problems accompanying industrialization,
urbanization, and growing wealth disparity, they began to support extensive government
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intervention in the economic realm. Flower, for example, abandoned laissez-faire economics
over the course of this decade and embraced a series of redistributionist measures, including
large-scale public works programs, Henry George’s single tax, and government ownership of
some industries. 199 He became an admirer of populists like Tom Watson and William Jennings
Bryan, progressives like Robert LaFollette, and even the socialist Edward Bellamy. Garrison’s
views seem to have undergone a similar evolution. 200 And Charles Thomas twice enthusiastically
supported Bryan for President of the United States; was elected Colorado governor in 1898 on a
fusion Democratic-Populist ticket; publicly endorsed and signed a bill establishing a maximum
eight-hour workday in the state’s smelting and mining industries; and proposed the establishment
of a state inheritance tax. 201 202
Licensing is, at its essence, a form of economic regulation. So why did such men
continue battling medical licensing even after they began to endorse other government
interventions in the economy? The answer lies in part in the fact that they never lost their
antipathy for special legislation. Their opposition to a state-supported medical monopoly directly
paralleled their denunciations of government grants of special privileges in other industries and
trades. Unlike Justice Field, Gilded Age enemies of medical licensing obdurately insisted that the
public health justifications provided for licensing laws were fraudulent and that their true
purpose was to enrich the Regular medical establishment.
But more important factors were also in play. Because of its connection to health and
mortality, medicine is never simply another trade. The regulation of doctors raises profound
issues of sovereignty over one’s body that are not similarly raised by the regulation of railroads,
for example. Moreover, in the Gilded Age, Regular physicians did not have a particularly strong
claim that their therapies were practically superior to those of other schools, nor that their
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materialist understanding of disease was scientifically more valid. Consequently, many
Americans believed that the suppression of alternative approaches would interfere not only with
their bodily autonomy, but also with their personal beliefs and with scientific progress. In other
words, to the era’s medical freedom proponents, state licensing represented not only a grant of
economic privilege to the Regulars, but also a grant of religious and intellectual privilege. And
American attitudes about the regulation of systems of belief (as opposed to economic affairs)
have their own, consistently libertarian history.
As we will see, the twentieth century brought new challenges to the medical libertarians.
One was the wide embrace of a Progressive political philosophy that prioritized societal welfare
over individual rights in the health arena. The other was the emergence of increasingly effective
orthodox treatments and the accumulation of empirical evidence demonstrating, to the
satisfaction of more and more citizens, that modern scientific medicine was a uniquely valid
approach to battling illness.
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